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ABSTRACT 
The European Commission’s Target Electricity Model (TEM) aims to integrate EU 
electricity markets. This paper estimates the potential benefit of coupling interconnectors 
to increase the efficiency of trading day-ahead, intra-day and balancing services across 
borders. Further gains are possible by eliminating unscheduled flows and avoiding the 
curtailment of renewables with better market design. In the short run the gains could be 
as high as €3.9 billion/yr, more than 100% of the current gains from trade. About one-
quarter of this total comes from day-ahead coupling and another third from shared 
balancing. If shared balancing is so valuable, completing the TEM becomes more urgent, 
and regulators should ensure these gains are paid to interconnectors to make the needed 
investment in the cross-border links more commercially profitable. 
Keywords: electricity market coupling, interconnectors, balancing, benefits 
Classification codes: D61, F15, L51, L94  
                                                 
1 Correspondence to: Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, 
Cambridge CB3 9DE, UK, Tel: +44 1223 335248 
E-mail address: dmgn@cam.ac.uk 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The European Union is, by the end of 2015, part way through the process of further 
integrating EU electricity markets by rolling out the Target Electricity Model (TEM). 
Most Member States have effectively implemented the TEM at the day-ahead stage, and 
by the end of 2014 the share of market coupling had risen from 60% in 2010 to 86% 
(ACER, 2015, p15). The harder intra-day allocation and shared balancing is still work in 
progress and not expected before the end of 2017. A key part of the TEM is improving 
the efficiency of cross-border trade over interconnectors. If that leads to a material 
increase in benefits, then two policy implications follow. First, these gains need to be 
reflected in payments to the infrastructure providing these services. In some cases, 
notably cross-border balancing, this does not yet happen. Second, if payments to 
interconnectors are materially increased, the commercial profitability of, and hence 
pressure to build, more interconnection will also increase and help meet the European 
Commission’s ambitious targets for cross-border links. 
The materiality of the gains from integration is also important as the required 
market reforms are costly in terms of changing software and market operations, and 
certainly run into tens of millions of euros for each Member State. As an example, when 
Britain replaced the centrally dispatched Electricity Pool by an energy-only market 
(NETA) in 2001, the UK’s National Audit Office estimated “that market participants 
could incur total costs of up to £580 million in implementing NETA over the first 5 
years, and then operating costs of £30 million a year.” (NAO, 2003).  
It is therefore timely to measure the benefits of market integration to judge 
whether the enterprise is worthwhile, whether it is so beneficial that it should be 
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completed more rapidly despite the difficulties, and whether it materially affects the 
profitability of investment in interconnectors. If, as argued here, the benefits are indeed 
large – several billions of euros per annum – then it becomes more urgent to accelerate 
the last difficult parts of the TEM, particularly sharing balancing services and reserves 
across borders and ensuring that potential interconnector investors see these gains 
reflected in profits and press for more and faster interconnections.  
The TEM is part of the wider Third Internal Energy Market Package that came 
into force in 2011 with among other objectives “… to urgently upgrade Europe’s 
networks, interconnecting them at the continental level, in particular to integrate 
renewable energy sources.”2 To press for continued and faster market integration DG 
ENER commissioned the authors to estimate the benefits of integrating electricity (and 
gas) markets (Newbery, et al, 2013).  
This paper sets out the methods used in that report and extends the results, using 
additional data published by ACER (2014, 2015) that was collected in response to our 
report. This paper adds to ACER’s estimates by extrapolating ACER’s partial coverage to 
the EU-28, using later data where this corrects earlier estimates (e.g. for unscheduled 
flows), but attempting to measure the pre-coupling situation. Although these are 
necessarily somewhat speculative, they identify more clearly the sources of major 
potential integration gains, although they do not include additional gains from the 
resulting increased competition. Where appropriate we compare our estimates with 
ACER’s estimates, but while ACER’s annual market reports are directed at monitoring 
                                                 
2 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1441631107710&uri=URISERV:180202_1  
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progress across a wide range of topics (such as retail competition and the gas markets) 
our aim here is to step back and assess the integration benefits of the TEM as it applies to 
wholesale electricity markets. 
Electricity market integration under the TEM couples cross-border 
interconnectors so that all electricity is (moderately) efficiently allocated across the EU 
by a single auction platform, Euphemia (Pan-European Hybrid Electricity Market 
Integration Algorithm).3 By mid-2014 the day-ahead coupling objective had been 
achieved from Finland to Portugal, including Great Britain. Coupling means that 
wholesale electricity prices should be equalized across boundaries unless the 
interconnector is constrained, in which case prices can diverge but the interconnector 
should be fully utilized. Before market coupling, capacity on interconnectors was sold 
before the day-ahead markets opened, and traders had to predict the price differences 
across interconnectors and bid for that capacity. Traders faced the risk that on the day the 
trade would no longer be profitable, in which case the option to flow power would be 
abandoned and the interconnector would be under-used, or, worse, the power would flow 
from the high price to the low price zone. 
The EU electricity market has an installed capacity of 948 GW in 2012, an annual 
production of 3,010 TWh in 2014 and trade between Member States in 2011 of 315 
TWh/yr, about the EU target of 10% traded power. If its average value is €50/MWh, 
production would be worth about €150 billion/yr. If the average value of capacity is 
                                                 
3 See PCR (2016) for a description of the algorithm and its workings 
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€500/kW,4 the installed capacity would be valued at some €500 billion. As part of the 
argument for closer integration, “the Commission estimated that about €200 billion of 
investment would be needed by 2020 in energy infrastructure Europe-wide.”5 Given these 
large sums, a small improvement in efficiency could amount to a large absolute sum of 
money.  
The next section summarizes existing estimates of the benefits of market 
integration. Section 3 sets out the methods for their estimation, section 4 presents the data 
calculates the arbitrage gains from market coupling, section 5 gives estimates if the other 
benefits of integration, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Estimating the benefits of market integration 
The two main methods of computing the potential benefits of market integration are to 
build a simulation model of the relevant area (ideally, the whole EU, normally some 
region) and compare the results with and without market coupling, as in some of the 
studies listed below and one used in this paper (Pudjianto et al. 2014), or to examine 
individual interconnectors before and after reforms. The first runs into the problem that it 
is challenging to replicate flows and generation even with a greatly simplified 
                                                 
4 The cost of a new Combined Cycle Gas Turbine is about €1,000/kW. New coal-fired stations 
cost around €1,800/kW, about the same as on-shore wind. Nuclear power and off-shore wind are 
more than twice these amounts. While existing stations are old and largely written down, their 
lower-carbon replacements are likely to be more costly than the €1,000/kW, partly because more 
capacity will be needed to deliver reliability. 
5 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.7.2.html  
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representation, particularly in the presence of market power (Neuhoff et al. 2005). The 
second runs into the usual problems that other factors (e.g. fuel prices) also change over 
the period studied and general equilibrium/network effects are ignored. The first of these 
objections is partially allayed as these factors will likely affect prices at both ends of the 
interconnector, and the benefits depend on differences across the borders. The second is 
more serious in meshed networks and much less of a problem with links to isolated 
systems (e.g. to GB, Spain), but still has to be addressed by estimating possible price 
impacts. 
Most of the following studies use the simulation approach, where estimating the 
benefits of more efficient electricity market integration has attracted intermittent attention 
in different jurisdictions and for a variety of reasons.6 Neuhoff et al. (2011) explored the 
benefits of the most efficient form of market integration via nodal pricing (as in PJM7) 
but including a large volume (125GW) of predicted future wind connection. They found 
savings of 1.1-3.6% of variable operating costs. If variable (mainly fuel) costs are 
roughly half total wholesale market value then the gains from full integration would be 
0.6-1.8% of wholesale market value. Leuthold et al (2005) simulated the benefits of 
adding 8GW of offshore wind to Germany and moving to nodal pricing, estimating that 
gains of 0.6-1.3% came just from a move to nodal pricing and an additional 1% would 
come from nodally pricing the additional wind.  
                                                 
6 A fuller literature review is provided in Newbery et al. (2013). 
7 Originally the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland interconnection, since expanded 
considerably. 
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One important study comparing before and after over a wide region is that of 
Mansur and White (2009), although their study is the more ambitious one of comparing 
different market designs, not just the benefits of market integration, but moving from 
bilateral trading to simultaneous market dispatch and clearing. They compared monthly 
prices before and after a bilaterally cleared zone joined PJM’s nodally priced market area 
to estimate reductions in price spreads, and estimated welfare gains in the same way that 
this paper does. They found incremental gains of $3.6 million/GW capacity, which if 
applied to the EU with 950 GW capacity would deliver $3.4 (€2.6) billion/yr or 1.7% of 
wholesale value. Ott (2010), building on Mansur and White’s (2009) study, found that the 
total benefits of efficiently pricing PJM were $2.2 bn/yr. However, these estimates are 
the benefits of moving to nodal pricing, whereas the TEM stops short at zonal pricing and 
so would not realize the full potential gains. PJM as a centrally dispatched system also 
automatically integrates intra-day and balancing, but these benefits existed before nodal 
pricing. 
When it comes to estimating the benefits of market coupling the literature is even 
sparser. De Jong, Hakvoort and Sharma (2007) simulated a simplified model of France, 
Germany, The Netherlands and Belgium (42% of total EU-28 production). They 
estimated the welfare effects of flow-based market coupling (FBMC) at about €200m/yr.8 
Meeus (2011) studied the history of the 600 MW Kontek HVDC cable from East 
Denmark to Germany, first from the period of no coupling, through two implementations 
                                                 
8 ACER (2015, p156) compares FBMC with the existing transitional approach using Available 
Transfer Capacity (ATC) and finds gains in flows where FBMC has been implemented (since 
May 2015) of up to 60% but more typically of 10%. 
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of approximate coupling, ending with one-way market coupling, still imperfect as it 
resulted in flows against the price differential (FAPD) of about 5%.  The estimated 
welfare gain was about €10m per year on that one cable or about €17 million/GWyr, 
much higher than the PJM estimates. 
SEM Committee (2011) estimated the social costs of not coupling the two 
interconnectors between GB and the Single Electricity Market (SEM) of the island of 
Ireland (which had a combined capacity of 950/910MW imports depending on the season 
but only 580MW exports) for 2010. The estimates included price responses and a dead 
band (with no trade) of €5/MWh to allow for various losses and transmission access 
charges. The social welfare gains from coupling were estimated at €30 million per year 
for an average import capacity of 930 MW,9 or €32 million/GWyr, more than twice that 
of the Kontek cable.  
In summary, simulation studies of FBMC find modest efficiency benefits that 
may underestimate the potential for two reasons. The models lack sufficient richness to 
identify all of the transmission difficulties that FBMC may relieve, and they are 
calibrated to earlier generation portfolios with less renewable generation and therefore 
likely less transmission congestion than now.  They indicate substantial value to 
increasing transmission capacity, and that FBMC will then be of even greater value in 
efficiently managing that capacity. 
Since our report several new studies have been published, as well as the ACER 
annual reports discussed below. Böckers et al (2013) measure the extent to which market 
integration can share peak demand more efficiently, and find that about half of 
                                                 
9 The export capacity is lower but exports are much less common. 
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neighboring countries’ peak demands is non-coincident and so the capacity needed to 
supply them jointly could be reduced. They report studies of price convergence that 
shows in some pair-wise comparisons that considerable convergence preceded coupling. 
They also report earlier studies that simulate the gains from improved competition and 
hence lower deadweight losses that our report did not explore. They roughly estimated 
gains from harmonizing PV support schemes and found large benefits (more than €700 
million/yr just by reallocating support from Germany to Spain). Newbery et al. (2013) 
looked forward to 2030 and found very large gains from harmonizing all renewables 
support, but these potential gains are not discussed in this paper. National Grid (2015) 
found that sharing reserves over interconnectors might reduce capacity needs by 2.8 GW, 
which at the 2014 capacity auction price of £19.40/kWyr would be worth €15 
million/GWyr, comparable to the Kontek cable. 
Pellini’s (2014) doctoral dissertation used a power simulation model of Italy with 
econometric estimates of price formation in bordering markets to examine the benefits of 
coupling the Italian market for 2012. She found that in the reference scenario for 2012 
and allowing for continued market power, market coupling increased net welfare (the 
arithmetic sum of changes in producer, consumer and transmission surpluses) by €33 
million/yr (M€/yr), but if coupling credibly increased competition on the northern border, 
the net welfare gain rose to 396 M€/yr, although this is still 278 M€/yr below that 
theoretically achievable under perfect competition. In the high scenario in which the 
economy recovered relative to 2010 and oil prices were higher, the welfare gain from 
coupling increased to 132 M€/yr without more competition, and to 742 M€/yr with more 
competition, 326 M€/yr short of perfect competition. These simulation results show that 
10 
 
the gains from integration can be highly sensitive to relative fuel prices (which clearly 
can affect the gains from trade), the level of demand in the importing country (Italy) 
particularly in the presence of market power and hence rapidly rising prices as demand 
tightens, and of course the impact that coupling has on market power. 
 
3. Method of Analysis 
Estimating the benefits of integration is not straightforward, as it inevitably involves 
either comparing the status quo ex ante with a counterfactual, or comparing the situations 
before and after, in which many other factors may have changed, including the whole 
pattern of generation and cross-border flows and with that the pattern of price differences 
across interconnectors. As noted above, the first method requires simulation models. The 
most sophisticated of these are large commercial software models (PowerSym, Plexos, 
etc.) that require massive data (much of it unavailable even to ACER or ENTSO-E). They 
typically compute efficient dispatch and thus ignore issues of market power. Tractable 
models inevitably simplify the grid representation, generation costs, market power and 
modeling flows before and after integration. The second method, adopted here, has other 
problems listed above. Our approach improves upon the simple ACER methodology by 
estimating possible price changes caused by flows over the interconnector under study, 
but if all interconnectors are coupled, then flows will increase more widely and should 
lead to additional price convergence. This will have the effect of shifting the ex post 
supply and demand schedules on each interconnector to the left, amplifying price 
convergence that will further reduce the estimated social welfare gain on each 
interconnector, only part of which is captured by our modeled price changes. Our over-
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estimate should not be exaggerated, as interconnector flows at full capacity are still 
modest compared to total generation. 
Other unrecorded impacts likely go in the other direction. As well as the directly 
observable impacts of increased flows and price changes as interconnectors are more 
efficiently used, there are harder to identify indirect benefits that may flow from 
increased cross-border competition, such as pressures to reduce cost, innovate, improve 
market functioning through increased liquidity, and improved sustainability if the volume 
of low-carbon electricity that can be delivered to final consumers increases and displaces 
more polluting sources. Improved market monitoring of the kind conducted by ACER 
also identifies other sources of potential improvement, such as moving from ATC to 
FBMC methods of calculating interconnection capacity, and comparing thermal and ATC 
limits (e.g. ACER, 2015, §4.3.1.2). This last is a measure of the potential benefits of 
moving to nodal pricing and will be discussed below under unscheduled flows in §4.5. 
Security of supply should improve, although the full benefits of reducing EU-wide 
reserve capacity needed requires those responsible for assuring security to make changes 
in the way they assess system security and adjust domestic capacity.10  
                                                 
10  Thus in the preparations for the UK 2014 capacity auction designed to deliver the specified 
security standard of a Loss of Load Expectation of 3 hours per year, the minister responsible, on 
the advice of the Transmission System Operator, set a standard that ignored any net contribution 
that the interconnectors might supply – see DECC (2014), National Grid (2014) and Newbery and 
Grubb (2015). Under pressure from DG COMP interconnector flows are now included in capacity 
adequacy assessments, but region-wide security studies are still imperfect. 
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In the longer run, the economics of building interconnectors should improve, 
encouraging further investment and allowing a more efficient location of generation 
across the EU to exploit the gains from improved trade. This is particularly the case with 
efficiently locating renewables where the resource (sun or wind) is best suited, and that 
will require more efficient forms of EU-wide support finance and burden sharing 
(Newbery, 2016).  
3.1 Measuring arbitrage gains from coupling 
The methodology for estimating the gains from coupling interconnectors at the day-ahead 
stage (largely complete by the end of 2014) is standard (c.f. Mansur and White, 2009) 
and measures the change in consumer and producer surplus,11 as shown in Figure 1. 
Fig. 1 
Figure 1a shows one possible configuration of the interconnector before and after 
coupling. Volume A is the amount used before coupling with the net supply schedule in 
the direction of trade, EG, and the net demand schedule, DH, shown. Market coupling 
then leads to the full utilization of the interconnector to volume B, narrowing the price 
difference as shown. The benefit of coupling is then the darker colored trapezium, on the 
(competitive market) assumption that the net supply represents the marginal cost 
(including any scarcity rents) and the net demand represents the willingness to pay for 
                                                 
11 This assumes that the prices in each market are equal to system marginal cost, SMC, or are 
competitive and that the supply and demand schedules do not change (as noted above, general 
equilibrium effects can shift both schedules to the left). If prices are above SMC, there is an 
additional gain equal to the change in trade times the mark-up between price and SMC, so this 
measure is conservative. 
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power. In algebraic terms the benefit is the average of the price differences before and 
after coupling times the increase in the volume of trade or the area of the trapezium 
DEGH. If coupling eliminated the price difference, as it does in Figure 1b, the benefit of 
coupling is only one half the rectangle assuming no price change. 
Figure 1b shows the case in which the interconnector is flowing power in the 
wrong direction. In this case point A corresponds to, say, importing a volume 0A when 
the efficient coupled solution would be exporting an amount 0C (the capacity of the 
interconnector is 0B in each direction, although there is no reason why export and import 
capacity should be the same). In this case the benefit is half the initial price difference ED 
times the volume AC, or the area DEH, which is half the area DEGF that assumes prices 
do not change. 
ACER (2013) makes the simplifying assumption that the prices do not change, 
which can be justified as it is very difficult to estimate the various price changes that 
would arise in the Continental meshed AC network. It is easier to do this for DC links 
that connect two separate markets with different prices. Ignoring price changes would 
tend to over-estimate the gains by measuring the area DEFK in figure 1a if the estimate is 
made before coupling, but underestimate the gains if the post-coupled price difference is 
used. Newbery et al (2013) estimated that in the case of the England-France 
interconnector (IFA), a change of trade of 1 GW into Britain would change British 
wholesale prices by €1/MWh. Larger price zones such as GB will tend to have smaller 
price impacts, and as GB is one of the larger EU price zones,12 this rough estimate might 
                                                 
12 There are 50 bidding areas covered by Euphemia but France and Germany are the only single 
price zones larger than GB. 
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tend to underestimate the gains from Continental coupling. In figure 1a this requires 
correcting the measured loss DEFK by subtracting the areas DKH and EFG, where the 
sum of KH and GF is given by the slope €1/MWh/GW and the change AB. This is half 
times the change in volume times the change in price, or equivalently ½ x 1 x AB2. 
3.2 Example: the France-England interconnector 
In 2011 exports from FR→UK used 58% of total capacity and from UK→FR a further 
12%, making the overall utilization of IFA 71%. (As an example of the approach see 
appendix table A1.) The average Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) in both 2011 and 2012 
was roughly 1.25 GW in each direction so an under-utilization of 29% is 0.36 GW. The 
estimated price change is €0.36/MWh, and the adjustment is half this or €0.18/MWh. The 
underutilization was 14 TWh; so the overstatement is €2.5 million, reducing the total 
2011 loss estimate, ignoring price changes, of  €22.4 million to €20 million, or by 10% 
(so not insignificant). In 2012 the underutilization was 12.7 TWh so the overstatement 
was €2.3 million, reducing the total 2012 loss from €20.8 million to €18.5 million or by 
12% (Newbery et al, 2013, tables 8.2, 8.4). The error in ignoring price impacts increases 
as the square of the shortfall, and so becomes smaller as interconnectors are more fully 
used. At the other extreme, if coupling eliminates the price difference, then the actual 
gain would be only half the measured gain assuming no price change. 
 
4. Data and estimates 
The results of comparing the original estimates in Newbery et al. (2013) with the more 
comprehensive ACER (2014, 2015) estimates are illuminating and are summarized in 
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aggregate in Table 3 below. The estimates in Newbery et al. (2013) concentrated on a 
few interconnectors (accounting for about 6 GW NTC) for which there was good data 
and which were not then coupled, and then developed other estimates for the future from 
market modeling while ACER had access to a wider (but still not comprehensive) set of 
interconnector data and more details about other services. The most recent ACER (2015) 
report normally aggregates over 46-48 border crossings, and reports that NTC averages 
for the regions studied remained roughly constant in aggregate (but not in all regions) 
from 2010-2014 at 50 GW. Trade of day-ahead nominations across a selection of 
interconnectors increased by 18% from 2011-14, presumably in response to coupling 
(ACER, 2015, fig 62). This paper uses the ACER data but extrapolates to provide EU-
wide estimates of the benefits of coupling by relating gains to interconnector capacities. 
The following sections quantify the gains by interconnector and per GW NTC for the 
different sources of benefits.  
4.1 Estimating day-ahead arbitrage gains from market coupling 
The social welfare losses on England-France interconnector IFA adjusted for price 
changes and resistive losses of 2% were 22% of the total potential arbitrage value of trade 
in 2011 (30% of actual value) and 12% of a higher potential value in 2012 (14% of actual 
value), averaging 16% of potential value (20% of actual value).13  
The Germany-France interconnection became coupled in Q4 2010 so the loss on 
the German-France interconnection was estimated for Q1-Q3 2010. The estimated loss 
was 26% of potential value, ignoring resistive losses because these interconnectors are 
short AC links connecting nodes adjacent to borders. The losses for France-Spain 2011 
                                                 
13 Newbery et al (2013) tables 8.2 and 8.4, corrected for the price change. 
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and 2013 (not given in our report but given in Appendix Table A1) were 11% and 12%, 
again ignoring resistive losses.  
In conclusion, Newbery et al. (2013) estimated the social losses of not coupling 
day-ahead for these examples at 10-20% of arbitrage value, depending on the year, the 
interconnector, and market prices. After coupling, these losses should fall to zero. To put 
this into context, EU exports (and imports) in 2011 were about 315 TWh out of 3,080 
TWh supplied in that year (or about 10%). 
These welfare losses on the interconnectors were estimated as a percentage of the 
gains from trade, which is the arbitrage gain from the price difference, not the standard 
measure of the value of trade, which is the price of the product times the volume traded. 
Thus to scale up the evidence from a few interconnectors one needs this measure of the 
gains from total EU-29 trade, which is difficult to estimate as it depends on price 
differences across the borders. One way to derive a very rough estimate is to note that the 
average absolute price difference across IFA for 2011-12 was €11/MWh.14 Using data 
from ACER (2015, fig 63) absolute average price differences across four important price 
zones (EEX, Nordpool, OMIE, EPEX, GME) weighted by interconnector flows have 
shown some convergence, from €11.66/MWh in 2008 to €11.79/MWh in 2012 and then 
falling to €6.83 in 2014. This last figure is consistent with congestion revenue for 2014 
(ACER, 2015, fig 75) which, assuming 8,000 hrs full utilization and efficient coupling 
for all of the 48GW interconnector reported, implies €5.8/MWh. The actual price 
difference will be higher than this as they were not all efficiently coupled. 
                                                 
14 Newbery et al (2013, tables 8.2, 8.4) assuming an average of 1,250MW for 8,760 hours. 
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Additional estimates come from the incremental value of expanding 
interconnectors, which ACER (2015, fig 84) provides for a sample of 24 such links. The 
values are given in € million per 100 MW extra capacity, assuming no change in prices at 
each end. This allows an estimate of the average initial price difference across each, 
assuming 100% utilization of the extra 100 MW for 8,000 hrs/yr. The 5-year average 
between 2011-14 was €6/MWh (varying from €5-7) with a standard deviation across all 
24 interconnectors of €6/MWh. Again price convergence implies a higher pre-coupling 
value. 
As noted above, prices have been converging over time and the proportion of 
flows in the wrong direction and the underutilization of interconnectors have both been 
falling (ACER, 2014, figs 85-6). Thus at the 2012 value of €11.79/MWh of the pre-
integration price difference (arguably an underestimate) the average value of the gains 
from trade of 315 TWh would have been €3.7 billion/yr, compared to the value of total 
wholesale demand of €150 billion at an average wholesale price of €50/MWh.15  If the 
estimated 10-20% welfare loss as a percentage of the gains from trade were to hold 
across the whole EU, the gains from efficient market coupling compared to the 2004 case 
of no coupling would be €370-740 million per year, or 0.25-0.5% of wholesale market 
value. 
ACER (2014, 2015) adopted the simpler form of our methodology, ignoring price 
changes and calculating the initial price difference times the change in volume as 
presented in Table 1, which gives the 2014 gains as a percent of the trade value assuming 
                                                 
15  That was the estimate for 2011 and equal to the measured price in 2012, which fell slightly to 
€46/MWh in 2013, see ACER (2014b, fig 35). 
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the average price difference of €6.83/MWh above. Some of the individual values in the 
originally published ACER Report were implausibly high, particularly those between the 
Single Electricity Market (SEM, the combined markets of NI and IE) and GB. After 
discussions with ACER, these figures were revised in the version placed on the website 
in December 2014 (and the 2015 data repeat the correct 2013 values). They are still high 
in relation to capacity, even though they have been minimized by putting the links in at 
their full nominal value, although the NI-GB link has been at only 50% capacity for some 
time. A quick calculation for 2012 for NI-GB in Appendix Table A2 suggests a loss of 
€7.5 million in 2012, which is very different from the original value of €43.6 m and even 
the revised value of €21.82 m shown in Table 1. SEM Committee (2011) estimated the 
2010 welfare loss of both SEM-GB cables together at €30 million. Table 1 therefore 
shows the subtotals ignoring the two SEM-GB interconnectors, and including them (the 
bottom line). In what follows the figures exclude the SEM, which, if included, is given in 
brackets. Thus the total loss in Table 1 for 2012 is €298 m/yr, 14% of trade value 
(€320m/yr, 15%), falling to €129 (€199) m/yr in 2014, 11% (16%) of the lower trade 
value (most interconnectors were coupled by mid-year). That is towards the lower of the 
estimate given above, which is understandable given price convergence and progress with 
coupling. 
Table 1 
Columns 2-4 in Table 1 give the ACER data. Column 5 gives the average 
contribution of each interconnector to the total measured loss as a percentage. Column 6 
gives the Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) based on the 2012 data used by Newbery et al. 
(2013), updated for some interconnectors from web searches. These figures should be 
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treated as rough estimates, since the variation on some interconnectors is from zero to 
several times the value shown in the table, and the weighted average standard deviation 
(SD) of the hourly 2012 NTCs on these borders was 42%.  
Table 1 shows the loss per MW of interconnector capacity of €13,560/MWyr. 
Scaling this up by the lower of import and export capacity of 83 GW gives €1,125 
million/yr, although by 2014 the loss had fallen to €5,860/MWyr, scaling to a reduced 
level of losses of €490 million/yr after (substantially) more coupling. The final two 
columns takes the estimated loss and divides it by the value of potential arbitrage trade 
for 8,000 hours per year at 100% utilization and assuming an arbitrage gain of 
€11.79/MWh (€6.83/MWh in 2014), and this welfare loss as a proportion of the potential 
arbitrage gains from trade is 14% in 2012, right in the middle of the range estimated 
above from the small sample of four interconnectors. One caveat noted above is that if all 
interconnectors are efficiently coupled, then the gains over each interconnector may fall, 
so scaling up to the whole of the EU may overestimate the total gains. The IFA example 
suggested that price changes might reduce the gains by 10%, in which case the EU-wide 
gains from coupling might fall to €1,010m/yr or 0.7 of 1% of total EU wholesale market 
value. 
 
4.2 Other gains from improved market integration 
The Target Electricity Model aims to integrate markets not just at the day-ahead stage, 
but intra-day and real-time via sharing balancing services, as well as sharing reserve 
capacity and allowing more efficient cross-border trading up to three years before 
delivery. As at end-2015, day-ahead coupling is largely complete, but other market 
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integration is lagging. DG ENER commissioned the authors to look ahead to 2020 and 
2030 to estimate the potential for future gains from more complete integration, for which 
Newbery et al (2013, §5.3) constructed various scenarios.  The model is set out in detail 
in Pudjianto et al. (2014). The Baseline scenario considered the persistence of 2014 
institutions (i.e. the TEM) but with continued self-reliance on security of supply, so that 
each country would invest in enough capacity to meet its reliability standard without 
importing in stress periods. It would choose that capacity to meet its renewables targets 
and build the EU planned transmission – 4 TWkm by 2015 and 45 TWkm by 2030 from 
the report’s base data date of around 2012..16 The Integrated scenario goes further in 
sharing reserves, but not balancing services. In case it is not possible to build all the 
planned transmission, the Int Low-TX case only builds half the justified transmission 
links. The Int Self-secure assumes countries continue to have adequate capacity to meet 
reliability standards without imports but is otherwise the same as Integrated. Int EU 
Reserve extends Integrated to include full cross-border balancing. Finally Int DSR also 
includes full demand side response with smart grids to manage peaks more economically. 
Figure 2 presents the results for Continuing Policy (CP) in terms of current renewables 
targets. 
Fig. 2  
                                                 
16 ENTSO-E publishes Ten Year Network Development Plans every two years and the latest 
(2014) at https://www.entsoe.eu/major-projects/ten-year-network-development-plan/tyndp-
2014/Pages/default.aspx lists 48,000 km of new or upgraded lines over the next decade, with an 
average size above 1 GW (TYNDP 2014, pp71-3) 
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For present purposes it is the difference between scenarios that is more relevant 
for market integration, as the main gains in absolute terms come from building socially 
beneficial interconnection, whose value rises sharply with increased renewables 
penetration. Thus Integrated 2020 estimated the additional gains that could come from 
efficiently moving away a case of national self-security and sharing reserves while 
completing the ambitious transmission investment but only using these for short-term 
arbitrage of the kind discussed above. In the less optimistic case in which only half the 
planned transmission investment is completed the impact is quite modest by 2020 (Int 
Low TX vs Integrated) reducing benefits by €1.3-1.8 bn/yr. The benefit of sharing 
reserves (Int self-secure vs Integrated) is €1.5-3.6 bn/yr, and the additional benefit of also 
sharing balancing services (Int EU reserve vs Integrated) is only €0.1 bn/yr by 2020. In 
contrast adding DSR and smart grids to better manage peaks across borders (Int DSR vs 
Int EU reserve) adds a further €1.6-2.8bn/yr by 2020. Such gains would take substantial 
investment and considerable institutional change, as well as trust, to deliver, which will 
take time - the TEM has already taken nearly two decades since the initial steps with the 
first Electricity Directive 96/92/EC. In the shorter run it is worth estimating the more 
realizable gains from better intra-day trading and balancing, addressed in ACER (2014). 
4.3 Intra-day trading benefits 
Since 2010, day-ahead utilization of interconnectors has risen from 32.1% to 40.0% in 
2014 or by 25%, while intra-day commercial (i.e. not TSO led) trading on borders with 
27 GW NTC increased from 1.8% to 4.1% of NTC between 2010-14, or by 130% (ACER 
2015, fig 92). 
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Data provided in ACER (2014) give some indication of the potential gains from 
better intra-day integration, and are reproduced as Appendix Table A3. Table A3 shows 
the benefits from more efficient intra-day trading over the borders sampled were 
€22,300/MWyr of interconnector capacity, or, dividing by 8,760 hrs/yr, €2.55/MWh (SD 
= €0.6, from the last two columns of Table A3). If interconnectors are only 40% fully 
utilized (ACER, 2014, fig 50) and if the total interconnector capacity is 83 GW,17 and if 
the volume of intra-day trading might double from its 2012 low level of 3%, an extra 
2,400 MW might be available on average perhaps 6,000 hours per year18 with a total 
value of €37 million/yr. This is consistent with scaling up the data in table A3 to the total 
interconnector capacity level, and assuming 200 MW are traded on the days when 
significant price differences are observed,19 also giving a value of €37 million/yr.  
4.4 Balancing service benefits 
DG ENER commissioned Mott MacDonald (2013) to estimate the potential gains from 
integrating European balancing markets for ACER’s Impact Assessment of the Electricity 
Balancing Framework Guidelines. The report estimated balancing benefits between GB 
and France of about €50 million/yr, and for the Nordic countries of about €220 million/yr 
                                                 
17 Data in convenient matrix form is available at 
https://www.entsoe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/_library/ntc/archive/NTC-Values-Winter-2010-
2011.pdf but post 2011 data does not seem to be available in convenient matrix form. The totals 
are the lower of import or export values limited by maxima. 
18 NTCs vary by season and for other reasons so this is a guesstimate of availability of 68%. 
19 The hours recorded in Table A3 assume at least 100 MW were free, so the assumption here is 
that as that was a de minimis cut-off, the actual is twice as high. 
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compared to individual “stand alone” balancing. Looking ahead to 2030 under 
“hypothetical” scenarios of the future European Power System, the estimated benefits 
increase with wind penetration and justify investing to enhance interconnectivity. 
Assuming the extra interconnection is built, integrating balancing markets and sharing 
reserves could achieve operational cost savings of about €3bn/year and reduce (by up to 
40%) the required reserve capacity. 
ACER (2014) provides estimates of the potential gains transcribed in Table 2 for 
a selection of borders in 2013.  
Table 2 
The simplest benefit to be gained is the netting of imbalances, in which one side 
of the border is short and the other side long, so that together they can reduce imbalances 
on each side. The other obvious benefit is to be derived from procuring balancing energy 
from abroad when it is cheaper. Table 2 gives estimates of each. The total value for FR-
GB is €39 m/yr, which can be compared with the estimates given in Mott MacDonald 
(2013) of full unconstrained Common Merit Order shared balancing between France and 
GB of €50 m/yr, which is of comparable size, given the difficulties of properly modeling 
the potential benefits. If one takes the balancing benefit as €33,000/MWyr (from the 
bottom right average) and if that is scaled up to the 2 GW FR-GB interconnector, the 
result would be €66 m, rather higher than this estimate, but again comparable.  
If this balancing benefit of €33,000/MWyr is scaled up to the 83 GW of 
interconnection, the result would be €2.7 bn/yr, which seems high. Figure 2 gives a 
model-based estimate of shared balancing for 2015 (Int EU reserves  less Int self-secure) 
varying from €1.2 – 2.8 bn/yr and from €1.6-3.7 bn/yr by 2020, when higher 
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intermittency would increase the value of shared balancing. These estimates, however, 
were additional to all the other benefits of market integration, and clearly if intra-day 
trading is both efficient and continued until just before dispatch, the remaining benefits 
from subsequent balancing will have already been largely captured. In short, there are 
problems in allocating the gains from integration over different time-scales, particularly 
as forecasting improves, and so one should not attach particular weight to one part of the 
total gains. There is the additional point that by its nature it is difficult to properly model 
future imbalances in an optimizing engineering model, as these rely on imperfections that 
the model may be designed to ignore, as well as estimating the scarcity costs given the 
many short-run constraints limited their delivery.  
ACER (2014, p140) admits that it is very difficult to properly value the potential 
benefits of sharing balancing services as that could “be obtained only through having 
access to (and the ability to process) all the data corresponding to the bids and offers 
submitted by all BSPs from all the imbalance areas”. Instead the estimate is based on “the 
imbalance price differences across imbalance price areas in Europe.” Using the data from 
ACER (2014, fig 56) shown in Table 2 one can calculate the value of netting and 
exchanging energy in €/MWh (the penultimate last two columns) which show netting 
values of €32/MWh and €27/MWh respectively, substantially higher than the day-ahead 
arbitrage values, but not implausible for balancing markets. 
Given the very high total value based on a simple extrapolation from the data in 
Table 2, it is worth exploring how better to extrapolate to the EU-28 from data covering 
only one-fifth of cross-border interconnection. From the data in table 2, the coefficients 
of variation (CVs) of netting and energy trading per MWh are 72% and 134% and the CV 
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of the total benefits per MW is 146%, while the average of the two least valuable borders 
is one third the average value. If the remaining interconnectors are one-third as valuable 
per MW NTC, given that the potential benefits identified in the subset of interconnectors 
amounts to €575 million, (larger for this subset than all the other potential gains), the 
total would be €1.3 billion per year, or 41% of the total estimated gains from trade (and 
double the upper end of the estimated arbitrage gains from coupling). If so, then the 
benefits from integrating cross-border balancing are considerably larger than those from 
coupling at the day-ahead stage, and if to realize these gains more spare capacity has to 
be held back to facilitate balancing, that would seem worthwhile.  
On the other hand, sharing balancing across borders is just one way of delivering 
flexibility at short notice, and as dispatch becomes smarter, and as more Demand Side 
Resources and storage are made available, so the marginal value of any one source of 
flexibility is likely to fall. Offsetting that will be the growth in need for flexibility with 
the growth in intermittent wind and solar PV generation. 
4.5 Welfare impact of unscheduled flows 
Acer (2015, figure 72 and Table A8) distinguishes between loop flows and unscheduled 
transit flows, which together are classified as unscheduled flows that arise because of 
imperfect coordination between TSOs, and the desire to treat each dispatch zone as a 
copper plate, instead of the US Standard Market Design (SMD) of nodal pricing. One 
dramatic measure of the mismatch between an efficient dispatch achievable under the 
SMD and that from the excessively large price zones in the EU is given by the ratio of 
NTC to thermal capacity, which averaged over the 44 links studied covering 82 GW is 
only 30% (ACER, 2015, fig 67). Central dispatch using a complete grid description 
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would make use of this entire thermal capacity. The cost of redispatch and the 
underutilization of potential capacity is a measure of what could be achieved with further 
reforms. 
ACER has more than doubled their earlier estimates (ACER, 2015, p169) as a 
result of now including the impact on reliability margins. ACER only measures the 
inefficiency for 21 “highly impacted borders” with an average (one-direction) NTC of 35 
GW out of a total of 96 GW. The cost of this inefficiency has risen from €793 million in 
2011 to a peak of  €1,095 million in 2013 before falling as a result of lower wholesale 
prices, with an average over the four years of €988 million. The average gains are thus 
€28 million/GW NTC, and if the remaining borders are only one quarter as valuable, the 
potential gains would be roughly €1,360 million/year. This is substantial and a measure 
of the failure to have nodal pricing (or at least far more price zones along congestion 
boundaries). 
4.6 Costs of curtailment at borders 
Acer (2015, fig 74) gives the costs of curtailment at a selected set of borders, a subset of 
which is reproduced with NTC data in Table A4. For the 26 GW of borders for which 
data are available for all years 2012-14 the total cost averaged €715/MWyr, with costs 
rising over time (presumably as renewables increase in volume). As several borders have 
been curtailed in both directions one can scale up in two ways. The higher estimate would 
be to take the higher value direction only for those for which we have values in both 
directions, for which there are 6.35 GW with data for all years, for which the average cost 
was €1,998/MWyr, but only include export interconnector capacity. Scaling this up to 83 
GW total would give an annual cost of €166 million/yr. The lower value would be to 
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scale up the overall average in the final line of €715/MWyr by the sum of export and 
import capacities of 182GW, which would give €130 million/yr. 
4.7 Summary of benefits 
The high value of increasing the efficiency of interconnector use is clear at a number of 
critical borders. The earlier estimate of the gains from increasing cross-border trade from 
10% of demand (315 TWh) to 15% of demand (i.e. by 158 TWh) assumed an average 
price difference before and after trade of €10/MWh and gives the benefit as €1.58 
billion/yr or 1% of the value of wholesale demand. This might be an under-estimate if 
some fraction of trade is in a perverse direction. Just improving the existing day-ahead 
arbitrage trade on interconnectors through coupling is worth 10-20% of the potential 
gains from trade, which at €12/MWh is 10-20% of €3.8 billion/yr or €380-760 million/yr. 
The estimate of 10-20% of potential trade is consistent with the day-ahead arbitrage gains 
estimated in Table 1, reported in summary table 3, but as they are scaled up to all 
interconnectors based on the gains per MW of capacity, they are then considerably larger 
at €1 billion/yr. 
Table 3 
However, in addition to these arbitrage gains from market integration, intra-day trading 
might be worth €40 million/yr, balancing benefits which might be €1.3 billion/yr or could 
be as large as €2.7 billion/yr, with proportionate scaling. These short-term realizable 
gains amount to €2.4 billion/yr and are itemized and subtotaled in Table 3. 
If unscheduled flows could be prevented (which might require a significant design 
change to nodal pricing) then an additional €1 billion might be gained. Finally, the cost of 
curtailment might be €130-160 million.  
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5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Table 3 shows that including these longer-term potential benefits with the short-term 
trading and balancing benefits gives total integration benefits of €3.9 bn/yr, which is 
2.6% of the value of 2012 wholesale demand, but more than 100% of the current gains 
from trade over the interconnectors, a more relevant metric. 
Specifically, if realizing these benefits and passing them through to interconnector 
owners, this increase of 100% should make already commercially attractive investments 
in interconnectors become even more so, and perhaps a large number of currently 
marginal investments would look attractive. Given that the Commission and ENTSO-E 
are pressing against considerable local resistance to increase interconnector capacity the 
most immediate policy implication is to ensure that the gains of market integration are 
properly allocated to their sources, and hence provide incentives for their enhancement. 
Certainly the case studies considered suggested that expanding transmission links that are 
severely congested is already likely to be very cost effective.  
The conclusion is that market coupling delivers total benefits that should 
substantially exceed the costs of the required market design changes, and that the delays 
in market integration since the market integration project started in 1997 have been large. 
Further gains could be reaped from a move to nodal pricing but these would have to be 
counterbalanced against the claimed loss of liquidity and scope for market manipulation 
that such a move might risk. What emerges very strongly is the growing need for more 
interconnection and the policy implication to ensure that interconnectors are remunerated 
for the whole range of services they provide.  
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Appendix 
Using the same methods set out in Newbery et al (2013) it is straightforward to compute 
the social welfare losses on the Spanish-French interconnection for 2011 and 2012, 
ignoring resistive losses as this is a short AC interconnection, and similarly for the Moyle 
interconnector between GB and NI. 
Table A1  
Table A2  
Table A4 takes the raw data from ACER (2015) and rearranges the borders into the 
directions with the larger of the two flows on that border in the top part, then the smaller 
valued direction, then the borders with only one direction recorded, first for which both 
years’ data are available, then for those with data in only one year, and finally totals and 
averages for each year and for both years. The values are then related to the estimated 
NTC values for 2011 from the ETSO NTC matrix. 
Table A3 
Table A4  
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Figures and tables 
 
Fig. 1 Benefits of market coupling: a) assuming no adverse flows and b) with flow 
originally against price differential 
 
 
Table 1  
Estimated ‘loss in social welfare’ 2012–2014 
Border 
2012 2013 2014 
average 
share 
2012 
NTC 
MW 
2012 Loss 
€’000/MWyr 
loss/gains from 
trade 
€ million 
€ 
million 
€ 
million 2012 2014 
CH-FR € 66.36 € 68.81 € 39.60 20% 2,300 € 28.85 31% 32%
CH-DE € 39.25 € 41.81 € 29.70 13% 4,000 € 9.81 10% 14%
CH-IT € 33.45 € 17.64 € 5.70 7% 4,000 € 8.36 9% 3%
CZ-DE € 32.98 € 35.13 n.a.  12% 1,600 € 20.61 22%   
AT-CZ € 23.28 € 16.21 € 12.10 6% 800 € 29.10 31% 28%
FR-IT € 18.85 € 18.13 € 5.40 5% 2,700 € 6.98 7% 4%
AT-SI € 18.37 € 18.73 € 8.40 5% 900 € 20.41 22% 17%
AT-HU € 17.69 € 14.56 € 7.40 5% 800 € 22.11 23% 17%
FR-GB € 14.03 € 15.85 € 1.90 4% 2,000 € 7.02 7% 2%
AT-CH € 13.24 € 14.54 € 10.70 5% 900 € 14.71 16% 22%
NL-GB € 12.53 € 10.06 € 1.30 3% 1,000 € 12.53 13% 2%
ES-FR € 8.34 € 7.25 € 6.80 3% 1,000 € 8.34 9% 12%
subtotal/av € 298.4 € 278.7 € 129.0 83% 22,000 € 13.56 14% 11%
IE-GB € 0.32 € 33.58 € 48.80 10% 500 € 0.64 1% 179%
NI-GB € 21.82 € 21.07 € 21.50 8% 500 € 43.64 46% 79%
Total/av € 320.5 € 333.4 € 199.3 100% 23,000 € 13.94 15% 16%
Source: ACER (2014b, fig 47) and ENTSO-E for estimated NTCs 
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Fig. 2.  Range of annual cost savings in integration scenarios relative to Baseline, CP 
market scenario, 2015-2030 
Source: Newbery et al. (2013) 
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Table 2  
Estimate of potential benefits from the integration of balancing energy markets per 
border, 2013  
  
Potential 
imbalance 
netting 
GWh 
Potential 
exchange  
balancing 
energy GWh 
max 
2012 
NTC MW 
Netting 
benefits 
€ million 
Exchange 
benefits  
€ million 
Netting 
value per 
€/MWh 
Exchange 
value per 
€/MWh 
Total 
benefit 
€'000/MWyr
GB-NL 231.95 1,816.45 1,000 € 15.9 € 66.5 € 68.38 € 36.60 € 82.4
ES-PT 727.46 3,595.93 2,400 € 25.3 € 50.2 € 34.78 € 13.95 € 31.4
AT-CZ 144.24 617.98 500 € 12.6 € 47.3 € 87.15 € 76.49 € 119.7
FR-GB 927.49 1,463.55 2,000 € 17.5 € 21.6 € 18.88 € 14.78 € 19.6
AT-HU 140.8 670.10 800 € 9.6 € 29.4 € 67.83 € 43.80 € 48.6
HU-RO 268 1,023.94 400 € 18.1 € 19.3 € 67.35 € 18.80 € 93.3
FR-ES 954.05 1,821.72 1,300 € 20.2 € 14.9 € 21.16 € 8.17 € 27.0
CZ-PL 114.85 457.29 150 € 9.7 € 18.6 € 84.81 € 40.59 € 188.7
FR-CH 110.05 1,653.60 3,200 € 4.1 € 24.0 € 37.35 € 14.53 € 8.8
BE-NL 542.17 1,400   € 26.8   € 49.41 € 19.1
PL-SK 66.82 121.93 550 € 6.7 € 19.8 € 99.97 € 162.31 € 48.1
AT-SI 405.61 900   € 24.0   € 59.19 € 26.7
CZ-SK 448.33 1,600   € 23.5   € 52.48 € 14.7
CH-AT 94.82 362.33 800 € 4.2 € 14.6 € 44.19 € 40.38 € 23.5
EE-FI 68.18 434.66 370 € 2.3 € 14.3 € 34.32 € 32.92 € 45.0
HU-SK   300.30 180   € 14.1   € 46.82 € 78.1
 Total or 
average 3,849 15,736 17,550 € 146 € 429 € 37.96 € 27.25 € 32.8
Source: ACER (2014, figs 56 and 58) and ENTSO-E 
 
Table 3  
Potential gains from market integration    
  ACER sample 2012 EU-28 estimate Newbery et al (2013) 
  € million 
NTC 
2012 
€'000 
/MWyr or 
MWh € million shares 
€'000/ 
MWyr or 
MWh 
EU-28 
est. € m 
increase 
trade 50%           €10/MWh € 1,575 
Day-ahead 
coupling € 300 22,000 € 13.6 € 1,010 26% € 14.6 € 1,208 
Intraday 
coupling   10,050 € 2.6 € 37 1%   
Balancing € 575 17,550 € 32.8 € 1,343 35%   
subtotal       € 2,390 62%   
Unscheduled 
flows € 988 34,900 € 28.3 € 1,360 35%   
curtailment € 19 26,075 € 0.7 € 130 3%   
Total       € 3,880 100%     
Note:  The values for increased trade and intra-day coupling (highlighted and italicized) are 
based on values per MWh, curtailment is based on import and export flows together.  
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Table A1  
Social welfare loss on the Spain-France interconnection 
FR-ES trade data 2011 
Potential value exports FR=>ES € 53,697,430 68%
Potential value exports ES=>FR € 25,517,523 32%
Potential total value trade € 79,214,953 100%
Loss under-export FR=>ES € 3,486,071 4%
Loss under-export ES=>FR € 3,331,524 4%
FAPD FR=>ES € 1,265,000 2%
FAPD ES=>FR € 260,053 0%
Total loss € 8,342,650 11%
FR-ES trade data 2012 
Potential value exports FR=>ES € 56,482,617 55%
Potential value exports ES=>FR € 45,810,192 45%
Potential total value trade € 102,292,810 100%
Loss under-export FR=>ES € 5,648,860 6%
Loss under-export ES=>FR € 3,621,960 4%
FAPD FR=>ES € 986,480 1%
FAPD ES=>FR € 1,538,622 2%
Total loss € 11,795,923 12%
 
Table A2  
Social welfare loss on the Northern Ireland – GB Moyle interconnector 2012 
Potential value of trade € 44,285,421 100%
Value of actual imports € 36,814,378 83%
Value of actual exports € 9,418 0%
total value of trade € 36,823,797 83%
Losses under-importing € 3,001,142 7%
Losses under-exporting € 219,209 0%
Losses FAPD € 4,244,833 10%
Total losses € 7,465,185 17%
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Table A3  
Potential for intra-day cross-border trade and efficiency in the use of cross-border intra-day 
capacity on a selection of EU borders – 2013 (number of hours) 
Border and 
auction Direction 
Max 
NTC 
2012 
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um
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r o
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 p
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gh
t a
xi
s)
 
es
tim
at
ed
 v
al
ue
 fo
r 1
M
W
 
va
lu
e/
M
W
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ES-PT (implicit) ES->PT 2,400 81 74 237 392 392 100% € 2,444   
  PT->ES 2,300 67 86 225 378 378 100% € 2,282 € 0.54 
FR-DE (implicit cts) FR->DE 1,500 976 168 32 813 13 69% € 15,912   
  DE->FR 1,200 878 153 58 693 30 64% € 14,415 € 3.46 
ES-FR (explicit) ES->FR 900 784 535 364 922 288 55% € 16,597   
  FR->ES 1,100 616 397 282 651 301 50% € 12,865 € 3.36 
FR-BE (pro rata) BE->FR 2,000 463 780 700 509 5 41% € 14,505   
  FR->BE 1,200 467 399 542 693 108 49% € 11,424 € 2.96 
FR-IT (explicit) FR->IT 2,500 447 372 614 567 82 40% € 11,151   
  IT->FR 1,000 254 426 306 370 - 38% € 7,710 € 2.15 
FR-GB (explicit) GB->FR 2,000 431 321 423 435 24 37% € 9,981   
  FR->GB 2,000 419 452 1,680 829 44 32% € 14,489 € 2.79 
  Total 10,050     
  
Average per 
interconnector   981 694 911 1209 303 56% € 22,296 € 2.55 
 
Sources: ACER (2014 fig 53), ENTSO-E 
 
. 
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Table A4  
Total curtailment costs per border 
border 2012 2013 2014 NTC average/MW 
GR->IT € 659,035 € 2,418,188 € 2,418,188 500 € 3,663.6 
BG->GR € 2,400 € 24,068 € 44,364 550 € 42.9 
AT->IT € 57,179 € 328,270 € 2,730,571 220 € 4,721.2 
DE->CH € 35,115 € 12,643 € 0 1,500 € 10.6 
FR->UK € 9,239,274 € 8,942,479 € 9,085,220 2,000 € 4,544.5 
ES->FR € 328,482 € 211,612 € 102,454 580 € 369.3 
NL->UK € 88,026 € 139,902 € 1,198,157 1,000 € 475.4 
major pair € 10,409,511 € 12,077,162 € 15,578,954 6,350 € 1,998.2 
IT->AT € 589 € 301 € 1,941 285 € 3.3 
CH->DE € 8,205 € 2,681 € 0 3,500 € 1.0 
IT->GR € 33,825 € 111,359 € 111,359 500 € 171.0 
UK->FR € 3,326,577 € 807,553 € 51,332 2,000 € 697.6 
FR->ES € 114,263 € 69,357 € 118,950 1,300 € 77.6 
UK->NL € 271 € 197,946 € 17,128 1,000 € 71.8 
minor pair € 3,483,730 € 1,189,197 € 300,710 8,585 € 193.1 
all pairs € 13,893,241 € 13,266,359 € 15,879,664 14,935 € 960.6 
        
FR->IT € 19,816 € 3,022,625 € 1,197,653 2,575 € 548.9 
FR->CH € 146,186 € 82,229 € 53,363 3,200 € 29.4 
CH->AT € 2,081 € 783 € 0 1,200 € 0.8 
CH->IT € 2,660,783 € 1,832,740 € 3,909,650 4,165 € 672.5 
subtotal   € 2,828,866 € 4,938,377 € 5,160,666 11,140 € 386.8 
Total  € 16,722,107 € 18,204,736 € 21,040,330 26,075 € 715.5 
Sources: ACER (2015 fig 74), ENTSO-E 
 
 
